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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ADVERSE POSSESSION
REPUDIATION.  Two brothers, William and Walter,
received an undivided interest in farm land from their father.
The brothers partitioned the land into equal sized tracts.
William's land had a fence running through it, dividing off 22.5
acres.  Walter and his children used the 22.5 acres for various
farming activities for more than 10 years.  The court held that
although as between separate owners of the two tracts, the 22.5
acres would have belonged to Walter under adverse possession,
because the 22.5 acres were transferred to William in the
partition, Walter would be required to repudiate the transfer of
the 22.5 acres before claiming title to the land by adverse
possession.  Beard v. McLaren, 798 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  A distributor of logging equipment held a
claim for unpaid equipment supplied to the debtor, a wholesale
and retail seller of logging equipment.  The creditor sought to
have the claim declared nondischargeable (1) as obtained by false
representations by the debtor as to the amount of equipment
sold, (2) for fraud while the debtor was acting in a fiduciary
capacity and (3) for malicious injury to the creditor's property
by the debtor.  The court noted that the creditor had allowed the
debtor to be delinquent in varying amounts over the course of
business dealings.  Although the debtor did not use accurate
recordkeeping methods and often misrepresented the amount of
equipment inventory, the court held that the debtor did not
intend to deceive the creditor and that the creditor did not
reasonably rely on the reports of sales by the debtor.  The court
also held that the consignment arrangement between the parties
did not create a fiduciary relationship.  Finally, the court held
that the debtor's sale of the equipment without accurate
reporting to the creditor was not a conversion of the creditor's
property because the creditor did not retain a security interest in
the inventory.  In re  Waning, 120 B.R. 607 (Bankr.
D. Mo. 1990).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  Within two months after the
debtor filed for bankruptcy, the debtor's aunt died leaving the
debtor a pecuniary bequest.  The trustee sought turnover of the
bequest from the decedent's estate under Section 541(a)(5).  The
estate argued that the bequest was not bankruptcy estate
property because the debtor was not entitled to the bequest until
the will was probated and the bequest was subject to an in
terrorem clause which would lapse if the debtor challenged the
will.  The court held that the bequest was estate property
because the debtor became entitled to the money as of the date
of the decedent's death.  The court also noted that the debtor was
prohibited under a duty to the trustee from challenging the will
in order to cause the bequest to lapse.  In re  Bentley, 1 2 0
B.R. 712 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor's interest in an IRA was held
not exempt under N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 284 as a
"pension, profit sharing, or similar plan or contract."  In re
Iacono, 120 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1990).
The debtors challenged the validity of a deed of trust against
their homestead securing a loan from the FmHA obtained for
the construction of a grain storage barn.  The debtors claimed
that under Tex. Prop. Code. § 53.059, the deed of trust was
invalid because the deed of trust did not contain all of the
essential elements of a contract.  The court held that the deed of
trust and development plan for building the barn could be
combined for the elements required for a contract such that the
deed of trust was a valid lien against the homestead.  In re
Burnett, 120 B.R. 839 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
The court held that the Texas exemption for IRA's, Tex.
Prop. Code § 42.0021, was not preempted by ERISA and that
the debtor's interests in seven IRAs and a profit sharing plan
would be exempt as a single retirement plan.  In re  Volpe ,
120 B.R. 843 (W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'g 100 B . R .
840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
The Chapter 7 trustee petitioned for turnover of the debtor's
interest in the State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois.
The court held that the retirement plan was not a spendthrift
trust and was bankruptcy estate property.  The court also held
that the state was not protected by governmental immunity
from turnover of the debtor's funds in the plan; however,
because the debtor was still employed by the state, the trustee
was not entitled to turnover of the debtor's interest in the plan
because the debtor could not require withdrawal from the plan.
In re  Groves, 120 B.R. 956 (Bankr. N.D. I l l .
1990) .
The debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified retirement plan
was held to be a spendthrift trust under New York law and
excluded from the bankruptcy estate.  In re  Johnson, 1 2 0
B.R. 992 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified retirement plan
was held to be a spendthrift trust under state (either Oregon or
Massachusetts) law and excluded from the bankruptcy estate.
In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
The husband and wife debtors filed a joint Chapter 7 petition
and both claimed an exemption for the homestead under the
federal homestead exemption.  The court held that both debtors
were entitled to a federal homestead exemption amount.  In re
Truan, 121 B.R. 9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
The Arizona exemption for IRA's was held not pre-empted
by ERISA.  In re  Herrscher, 121 B.R. 29 (Bankr. D .
Ariz. 1989).  The Kansas exemption for IRA's was held not
pre-empted by ERISA.  In re  Lindley, 121 B.R. 8 1
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).
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The debtor's interest in money received from a state
employee retirement fund was not exempt where the debtor
voluntarily terminated employment and voluntarily withdrew
the money.  In re  Fitak, 121 B.R. 224 (S.D. Ohio
1990) .
  CHAPTER 12
PLAN.  The debtor partnership's Chapter 12 plan was not
confirmed where (1) the plan did not provide for payment of the
value of planted crops remaining after payment of secured
creditors, (2) the interest rate, 9.75 percent, on deferred
payments of secured claims, was less than the interest rate on
Treasury Bills plus two percent, 10.85 percent, (3) the debtor
failed to demonstrate sufficient source of operating funds to
support income projections during the plan, and (4) the plan
made provision for payments on a lien against property not
owned by the partnership.  In re  Lupfer Bros., 120 B . R .
1002 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990).
In the debtor's plan, a bank's secured claim was listed as
such but the debtor agreed not to seek alteration of the bank's
claim in a state court action in tort for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty.  The bank argued that the Chapter 12 plan
preempts any state court action altering the relationship of the
bank and the debtor.  The court held that because the state tort
action did not seek to alter the contractural relationship between
the debtor and the bank, the state tort action was not pre-empted
by the Chapter 12 plan.  In re  Mann Farms, Inc., 9 1 7
F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1990).
  CHAPTER 13
PLAN .  The debtor filed a previous Chapter 13 case in
which a first mortgage against their house was discharged.  The
debtor filed a second Chapter 13 case and proposed a plan which
would pay the arrearage of the mortgage and resume regular
payments.  The court held that because the discharge of the
mortgage in the first case relieves the debtor of any liability on
the mortgage, the debtor may not include the mortgage in a
later case.  In re Lawson, 120 B.R. 859 (Bankr. W . D .
Ky. 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ATTORNEY FEES .  The debtor was not allowed to
deduct the legal fees incurred in bankruptcy where the attorney
did not bill the debtor because of a conflict of interest.  Allen
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-651.
AUTOMATIC STAY.  An IRS notice of deficiency for
excise tax liability due for self-dealing was not prohibited by
the automatic stay after the debtor's Chapter 11 plan was
confirmed.  Moody v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 4 7
(1990) .
Similarly, the release of a debtor from dischargeable debts
terminated the automatic stay and restored jurisdiction to the
Tax Court.  Ginella v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-
648 .
DISCHARGE.  The debtor filed a Chapter 7 case in
March 1988, within 240 days of the IRS assessment of the
debtor's tax liability for 1981, 1982 and 1983.  Upon learning
that those taxes would not be dischargeable, in September
1988, the debtor filed for and obtained a dismissal of the case,
stating the discharge issue as reason for the dismissal.  The
debtor filed a second Chapter 7 case 22 days later, more than
240 days after the taxes for 1981, 1982 and 1983 were assessed.
The court held that the 240 day limitation period was tolled
during the first Chapter 7 case; therefore, the taxes remained
nondischargeable.  In re  Davidson, 120 B.R. 7 7 7
(Bankr. D. N.J. 1990).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition in October 1987 and
discharge was granted in October 1989.  The debtor filed a
Chapter 13 petition in April 1990 and the IRS filed a claim for
income taxes for 1985 through 1987 taxable years.  The court
held that the three year time limit on nondischargeability of
taxes for which a return was due more than three years before
the petition was tolled during the Chapter 7 case and the taxes
were nondischargeable in the Chapter 13 case.  In re  Bryant,
120 B.R. 983 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990).
The debtors filed a Chapter 7 case in August 1989 and
claimed their taxes for 1981, 1982 and 1983 were dischargeable
because the tax deficiency for those years was assessed when the
returns for those years were audited.  The deficiencies resulted
from the debtors' use of investment tax credit carrybacks from a
tax shelter.  After the IRS audited the tax returns, an assessment
was delayed while litigation involving the status of the tax
shelter was pursued.  After the tax shelter was held invalid, the
debtor petitioned the Tax Court for a determination of tax
liability.  After the Tax Court determined the debtors' tax
liability, the IRS sent the debtors notice of the deficiency in
June 1989.  The court held that the date of assessment was the
date this notice was sent to the debtors, within 240 days of the
bankruptcy filing and the taxes were nondischargeable.  In re
Oldfield, 121 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990).
PRIORITY.  The assessments made against the debtor for
failure under ERISA to meet the minimum funding
requirements were not taxes entitled to a seventh priority but
were penalties subject to equitable subordination to claims of
other unsecured creditors, although no inequitable conduct by
the IRS was found.  Matter of Mansfield Tire &
Rubber Co., 120 B.R. 862 (N.D. Ohio 1990), aff'g
80 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
SETOFF .  The debtor filed for a refund of taxes paid in
two pre-petition taxable years and the IRS asserted its right to
offset the refund and interest against the debtor's pre-petition tax
liabilities.  The debtor and IRS signed an agreement which
acknowledged the refund and IRS setoff rights and the debtor
filed a motion for enforcement of the agreement.  The court held
that the IRS did have a right to offset the refund against other
pre-petition tax liabilities and that the offset occurred as of the
date six months after the IRS failed to respond to the debtor's
claim for a refund.  In re  Rozel Industries, Inc., 1 2 0
B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
CONTRACTS
WARRANTY.  The plaintiff purchased tomato seeds from
the defendant and the sales contract contained disclaimer of
warranty and limitation of liability clauses which limited the
defendant's liability to the price of the seed purchased.  The
plaintiff sued for the loss of the seed and profits because the
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tomato plants were infected with tomato canker, a seed borne
disease.  The plaintiff claimed that the limitation clauses were
unconscionable.  The court held that the clauses were not
unconscionable because of the experience of the plaintiff in
buying tomato seeds and the inability of the defendant to detect
the disease in tests conducted on the seed.  Jones v. Asgrow
Seed Co., 749 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
CORPORATIONS
INDEMNIFICATION.  The plaintiff was a commodity
broker with an account with a corporation to sell almonds in
Northern California.  Two of the corporation's employees who
started their own brokerage business were able to take the
brokerage account from the plaintiff.  The plaintiff sued the
corporation and two of its employees for breach of contract,
intentional interference with contract and intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage.  The trial court awarded
damages to the plaintiff as against only the two employees.
The employees sought indemnification from the corporation
under Cal. Corp. Code § 317.  The court held that the
employees were not entitled to indemnification because the
employees were sued for their actions taken for their own
benefit and not for the benefit of the corporation and the
employees did act in good faith.  The court also held that an
indemnification agreement between the corporation and the
employees was insufficient because the agreement only provided
for indemnification as required by Section 317.  Plate v .
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 275 Cal. Rep. 6 6 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.  The plaintiffs
filed suit against the EPA challenging the EPA policy of
treating pesticides which have not received EPA approval but
have been found to cause cancer (new pesticides) differently
from pesticides which have received approval but have been
found to cause cancer (old pesticides).  Old pesticides are not
subjected by the EPA to the statutory requirement that
pesticides be banned if they concentrate in processed foods in
sufficient amounts to cause cancer.  The court held (1) the EPA
policy was subject to judicial review without requiring the
plaintiffs to pursue administrative review first, (2) the EPA
policy was a final agency action even though the EPA stated
that it had not reached a final position on the issue, because the
EPA had been applying the rule for over 20 years, (3) the court
had authority to order EPA compliance with the statute because
the statute provided mandatory requirements on the EPA, (4) the
matter was sufficiently ripe for judicial review because the
administrative review procedures would be inefficient and
duplicative in requiring the plaintiffs to bring actions for
individual pesticides, and (5) the plaintiffs stated a claim for
which relief may be granted in that the statutory provisions are
mandatory on the EPA and do not allow agency discretion in
application as to "new" versus "old" pesticides.  California
ex. rel. Van de Kamp v. Reilly, 750 F. Supp. 4 3 3
(E.D. Cal. 1990).
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The plaintiffs were farmers
with FmHA loans who received discharges in bankruptcy.
Under 7 C.F.R. §§ 1951.907(c), 1962.47(a)(3)(ii), the FmHA
did not send notices to these debtors of their rights under the
loan servicing programs.  The FmHA argued that because the
personal obligations of the farmers had been extinguished by
the discharges, the farmer no longer were borrowers entitled to
the loan servicing benefits.  The court held that the FmHA
regulations were reasonable interpretations of the statutory
provisions governing restructuring rights of FmHA borrowers.
Lee v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990) ,
aff'g  106 B.R. 588 (D. Minn. 1989).
CATTLE.  The AMS has issued proposed rules for grade
standards for dairy breeding cattle.  The cattle would be graded
on the basis of weight for age, body capacity, feet and legs,
dairy character and mammary development.  The Dairy Cow
Unified Score Card of the Purebred Dairy Cattle Association
will be used as a guide in applying the standards.  56 Fed.
Reg. 801 (Jan. 9, 1991), adding 7 C.F.R. § 5 3 . 3 0 0
et seq.
FARM LOANS .  The CCC has issued an interim rule
providing the procedures for settlement of debts resulting from
overpayments of 1988 and 1989 advance deficiency payments as
provided in the 1990 farm bill, see Vol 1, p. 245.  The
regulation defines "financial hardship" to mean that a lump sum
payment of the overpayment would jeopardize the producer's
ability to provide food, shelter and medical care to the
immediate family or to continue the farming operation.  5 6
Fed. Reg. 359 (Jan. 4, 1991).
The CCC has issued an interim rule implementing the 1990
farm bill provision allowing "subsequent holders" of expired
commodity certificates 180 days to exchange the certificates and
obtain interest on the certificates as an original holder for 150
days.  See Vol 1, p. 246.  56 Fed. Reg. 360 (Jan. 4 ,
1991) .
The plaintiffs had been sued by the USDA for violations of
the upland cotton price support program and the plaintiff
counterclaimed for removal of their names from the federal debt
register and release of impounded money.  The USDA's suit
was dismissed because of the lapse of the statute of limitations
and the dismissal was upheld on appeal to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.  The court ruled that the dismissal of the
USDA claim was res judicata as to whether the plaintiffs
violated the price support program provisions and ordered
removal of the plaintiffs' names from the debt register and
release of the plaintiffs' funds.  Doko Farms v. U.S., 2 1
Ct. Cl. 696 (1990).
NATIONAL FORESTS.  The U.S. Forest Service was
not required to prepare a comprehensive management plan under
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1283(a), for a
proposed sale of burned timber adjacent to the south fork of the
Trinity river.  Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d
813 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'g 701 F. Supp. 1 4 7 3
(E.D. Cal. 1988).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT .  The
complainant was a cattle rancher who sold cattle through the
respondents, a marketing agency subject to the PSA.  The
complainant sought reparation for the difference between the
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price paid for the cattle and the price the respondents said the
cattle would be sold for.  The Judicial Officer held that because
the first shipment of cattle was sold on a consignment basis,
the complainant had no expectation of a set price for those
cattle.  However, on two later shipments, the respondents had
told the complainant the arranged price for the cattle.  The JO
held that the complainant had relied on these representations of
price before releasing the cattle for sale and was entitled to
receive the difference between the stated price and the amount
actually received.  Bain v. Goodman, 47 Agric. Dec .
1417 (1988).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODI-
TIES ACT .  One of the plaintiffs with claims against the
defendant's PACA trust moved for summary judgment that all
trust funds be paid to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was the
first to file its claim against the fund.  The court held that
where the PACA trust does not hold sufficient funds for all
claimants, a pro rata distribution of the funds would be made.
Finest Fruits, Inc. v. Korean Produce Corp., 4 7
Agric. Dec. 1423 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
The plaintiffs sold potatoes to the defendant who failed to
make prompt payment.  The plaintiffs sought recovery of
PACA trust funds dissipated by the defendant to unsecured
creditors.  Some of the funds sought were further dissipated to
fourth parties.  The court held that parties which received
PACA trust funds were liable for recovery of those funds if they
knew or should have known that the funds were subject to the
PACA trust provisions.  The court also held that date for
determining when the PACA trust fund provisions were
violated by the defendant was the date the defendant failed to
make timely payment for the potatoes; thus, payments from the
PACA trust fund could be recovered if made after that date and
the unsecured creditor knew or should have known that the
payment violated the PACA trust.  Lyng v. Sam Compton
Produce Co., Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1427 (1988).
PRICE SUPPORT .  The CCC has adopted as final the
support price for milk containing 3.67 percent milkfat at
$10.10 per hundredweight from January 1, 1991 through
December 31, 1995.  56 Fed. Reg. 991 (Jan. 10, 1991).
RURAL HOUSING LOANS .  The FmHA has issued
proposed rules amending the guaranteed rural housing loan
regulations to provide for an interest assistance program, to
remove obstacles in guaranteed loan making and to revise the
method of guaranteeing loans made by other lenders.  56 Fed.
Reg. 202 (Jan. 3, 1991).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  The FmHA has
announced the removal of 7 C.F.R. Part 1927 regarding the use
of the federal statute of limitations as a defense in suits on
FmHA claims.  56 Fed. Reg. 943 (Jan. 10, 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES .  The decedent's
estate filed an estate tax return four years and eight months
overdue and claimed deductions for interest on the late paid
federal and state taxes.  The IRS ruled that the interest was
deductible even though the expense was incurred as a result of
the willful delay in filing and paying the federal estate tax.
Ltr. Rul. 9051002, Sept. 18, 1990.
BEQUESTS TO CORPORATIONS.  The decedent
owned an interest in a trust established by a predeceased spouse
and containing S corporation stock.  The decedent exercised a
power of appointment over the trust in favor of the decedent's
estate to pay taxes, with the remainder of the estate to pass to
the S corporation. The IRS ruled that the bequest to the
corporation would be treated as a bequest to the individual
shareholders.  Because the decedent was never an employee or
manager of the corporation and never directly owned stock in
the corporation, the deemed bequests to the shareholders were
not included in the shareholders' or corporation's taxable
income.  Ltr. Rul. 9050056, Sept. 19, 1990.
DISCLAIMERS.  A trustee attempted to make a
disclaimer of the trustee's power to invade corpus for the
beneficiary, but the disclaimer was not valid under state law.
The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was not effective under federal
gift tax law.  Rev. Rul. 90-110, I.R.B. 1990-52, 5.
The decedent established an intervivos trust to which
property from the decedent's estate was added at the decedent's
death.  The beneficiaries of the trust included the decedent's four
adult children with remainders to the decedent's grandchildren if
they survive their parents.  If no grandchild survived, the trust
property passed by the state laws of intestacy.  The children
proposed to disclaim a portion of their interests in the trust and
the grandchildren also proposed to disclaim their interests in the
trust.  The IRS ruled that the disclaimers of the children were
not qualified because some of the disclaimed property would
pass to them under the intestacy laws.  The IRS also ruled that
the disclaimers of the grandchildren would be qualified because
made by court appointed guardian ad litem.  Ltr. R u l .
9051007, Sept. 18, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The decedent's will created a marital trust eligible as QTIP. The
trustees of the trust proposed to split the trust into two trusts,
each with the same provisions as the first trust.  The trustees
will make the QTIP election for one of the split trusts and a
reverse QTIP election for GSTT purposes.  This trust is to
receive the entire GSTT exemption amount such that the
inclusion ratio is zero.  The other trust will have an exclusion
ratio of one.  The IRS ruled that the split of the trust and
allocation of the GSTT exemption was valid.  Ltr. R u l .
9050022, Sept. 14, 1990.
An irrevocable trust was created before October 21, 1942.
The beneficiary disclaimed the power to designate the
beneficiaries of the trust and the heirs of the beneficiary also
disclaimed their interests in the trust.  The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were not transfers subject to gift tax and would not
make the trust subject to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9051012 ,
Sept. 20, 1990.
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Two trusts were established over 35 years ago and the
current beneficiary is the grantor's surviving spouse with the
remainder interest held by the grantor's children.  The trusts are
each to be partitioned into two equal trusts to be separately
administered under the provisions of the original trusts.  The
IRS ruled that the income tax items of the assets in the
resulting trusts will be the same as the original trusts and no
gain or loss or other tax liability will be recognized from the
partition of the trusts.  In addition, the partition will not
subject the resulting trusts to GSTT unless additions are made
to the trusts.  If the beneficiaries of the trusts waive any right
to income distributions from the trusts, such waiver will result
in a taxable gift of part of that income to the remainder holders
and will constitute additions to the trusts, subjecting the trusts
to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9052023, Sept. 28, 1990.
GIFTS.  The taxpayer transferred stock in an S corporation
to an eight-year trust with the taxpayer as sole beneficiary.  If
the taxpayer dies more than two years and less than eight years
after formation of the trust, the trust corpus reverts to the
taxpayer's estate.  If the taxpayer dies within two years after or
lives more than eight years after creation of the trust, the
principal is to be added to a trust for the taxpayer's son.  The
value of the taxpayer's reversionary interest is more than 5
percent but less than 25 percent of the value of the retained
income interest in the trust.  The IRS ruled that the transfer of
the contingent remainder interest to the son's trust was a taxable
gift.  The taxpayer's interest in the trust was a qualified trust
income interest such that the termination of the taxpayer's
interest would not be a gift.  Ltr. Rul. 9050013, Sept .
13, 1990.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, created five short-term
trusts for their children funded with stock in their closely held
family corporation.  The grantors retained the income interest in
the trusts with the entire interests passing to the children upon
termination of the trusts.  The trustees had the power to
reinvest unproductive trust property.  The taxpayers argued that
the value of the retained interests may be valued using the
actuarial tables of Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) even though the
dividends on the stock were small (.2 percent).  The IRS argued
that because the trustees never intended to reinvest trust
property, the value of the retained income interests was zero.
The court held that the retained income interests could be valued
using the actuarial tables.  O'Reilly v. Comm'r, 95 T . C .
No. 46 (1990).
INSURANCE PROCEEDS .  The decedent established
an intervivos trust with the spouse and children as beneficiaries.
The trustee, a bank, acquired a life insurance policy on the life
of the decedent and paid the premiums from funds contributed to
the trust by the decedent.  Although the beneficiaries had the
power to withdraw any contributions to the trust, they never
did.  The court held that because the decedent did not hold any of
the incidents of ownership at death, the proceeds of the policy
were not includible in the gross estate.  The court rejected the
IRS argument that the trustee acted as an agent of the decedent
sufficient to constructively give the decedent the incidents of
ownership.  The court also refused to include the payment of
premiums as an incident of ownership.  Est. of Headrick v .
Comm'r, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g 9 3
T.C. 171 (1990).
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  A testamentary trust was
established for the surviving spouse which was to be split into
two shares to be treated as separate trusts.  The marital trust
was to receive as much of the residuary estate property as would
be necessary to prevent imposition of federal estate tax on the
grantor's estate.  The surviving spouse was to receive so much
of the principal of the trust as was necessary for support and
maintenance and all income at least quarterly.  A portion of the
marital trust, equal to the grantor's GSTT exemption, was
allocated to a separate terminable interest trust.  The IRS ruled
that the marital and terminable interest trusts were eligible
QTIP.  Ltr. Rul. 9051022, Sept. 24, 1990.
A testamentary trust was established for the surviving
spouse which was to be split into two shares to be treated as
separate trusts.  The marital trust was to receive as much of the
residuary estate property as would be necessary to prevent
imposition of federal estate tax on the grantor's estate.  The
surviving spouse was to receive so much of the principal of the
trust as was necessary for support and maintenance and all
income at least quarterly.  If S corporation stock became trust
property, the stock was to be held in a separate trust eligible as
a qualified subchapter S trust (QSST) but otherwise subject to
the same provisions as the marital trust.  If the QSST trust
terminates, the stock is to be distributed to the surviving
spouse.    The IRS ruled that the marital trust was eligible
QTIP.  Ltr. Rul. 9051023, Sept. 24, 1990.
The decedent's will established a trust funded with
distributions from two IRA's, with the annual distributions to
be considered as trust income and distributed to the beneficiary,
the surviving spouse, when received by the trust.  The IRS held
that the surviving spouse's interest in the trust was QTIP.
Ltr. Rul. 9052015, Sept. 28, 1990.
The taxpayer's will provided for the creation of several trusts
to be funded by an intervivos trust.  An exempt credit shelter
trust was to be funded with a fraction of the estate equal to the
ratio of total estate tax credits to the value of the residuary
estate.  The IRS ruled that so long as the trust assets fairly
represented the appreciation and depreciation of all assets, the
inclusion ratio of the trust was zero.  The will also established
a marital trust with the surviving spouse as income beneficiary
with a general power of appointment over the trust property.
The IRS held that this trust was eligible for the marital
deduction.  The IRS also held that another trust, a QTIP marital
trust, was eligible for the marital deduction where the surviving
spouse was the income beneficiary and had the right to
withdraw up to 5 percent of principal at the end of each trust
year.  Ltr. Rul. 9052020, Sept. 28, 1990.
TAX LIEN.  The decedent bequeathed a 100 acre
homestead to three children but under a state court judgment,
the surviving spouse was held to be entitled to live on the
property for life.  The IRS held a valid lien against the
decedent's property for unpaid federal estate tax and sought
foreclosure and sale of the 100 acres to pay the taxes.  The court
held that the property could be sold and that the surviving
spouse was entitled to the proceeds equal to the value of the life
estate in the homestead.  U.S. v. Blakeman, 750 F .
Supp. 216 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
A shareholder in an S corporation received a note from the
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corporation for money the shareholder loaned to the corporation.
The note was payable on a date certain and accrued interest at
the prime rate plus 1 percent.  The note was subordinated to the
claims of a bank against the corporation.  The shareholder
transferred a portion of the note to an irrevocable trust for the
shareholder's grandchildren.  The IRS ruled that the note was
qualified debt and would not be included in the shareholder's
gross estate under Section 2036(c).  Note: Section 2036(c) was
repealed by RRA 1990.  Ltr. Rul. 9050042, Sept. 1 8 ,
1990 .
The taxpayer, aged 62, established a ten-year trust with the
taxpayer as income beneficiary.  If the taxpayer died before the
termination of the trust, the trust property passed to the
taxpayer's estate, and if the trust terminated at the end of ten
years, the property passed to the taxpayer's children or issue.
The IRS ruled that the establishment of the trust was a
completed gift of the remainder interests and the taxpayer's
interest in the trust was a qualified trust income interest not
includible in the taxpayer's gross estate.  Ltr. R u l .
9052011, Sept. 27, 1990.
The taxpayer, aged 78, established a five-year trust with the
taxpayer as income beneficiary.  If the taxpayer died within two
years, the trust corpus passed to the taxpayer's children.  If the
taxpayer died in the last three years of the trust, the corpus
passed to the taxpayer's estate.  The taxpayer had the power to
require the trustee to convert unproductive property into
productive property.  The IRS ruled that the transfer of property
to the trust was a completed gift of the remainder interest.  In
addition, each year that the taxpayer failed to require the trustee
to convert unproductive property, the lost income would be a
taxable gift.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer's interest in the
trust was a qualified trust income interest and the trust property
would not be included in the taxpayer's gross estate if the
taxpayer survived the trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9052031, Sept .
28, 1990.
The grantors established two ten-year trusts with the
grantors as income beneficiaries.  If the grantors survived the
trust, the trust corpus passed to the grantors' children.  If the
grantors died before the ten-years expire, the corpus passed
according to appointments made by the grantors.  The grantors
had the power to require the trust to convert unproductive assets
to productive assets.  The IRS ruled that the transfers to the
trusts were completed gifts of the remainder interests.  Each
year that the taxpayer failed to require the trustee to convert
unproductive property, the lost income would be a taxable gift.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer's interest in the trust was a
qualified trust income interest and the trust property would not
be included in the taxpayer's gross estate if the taxpayer
survived the trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9052050, Oct. 3, 1990.
VALUATION.  The decedent's will bequeathed 51 percent
of the stock in the decedent's corporation to a trust for the
decedent's son, with 49 percent passing to a marital trust for the
surviving spouse.  The trustees of both trusts were the
surviving spouse, a child from the decedent's previous marriage
and a bank.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's share of
stock was entitled to a minority discount.  Ltr. R u l .
9050004, Aug. 31, 1990.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD.  The IRS has issued
temporary regulations providing guidance for C corporations,
partnerships with a C corporation as a partner, and tax shelters
who fail to change from the cash method under I.R.C. § 448.
Taxpayers subject to the accounting method change have until
July 8, 1991 to file amended returns reflecting the proper
accounting method.  After that date, taxpayers must comply
with the general method change requirements of Treas. Reg. §
1.446-1(e)(3).  56 Fed. Reg. 485 (Jan. 7, 1991 ) ,
amending Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T.
DEPRECIATION.  One of three conventions applies to
depreciable property placed in service on an item-by-item basis
after July 31, 1986, to determine what time during the taxable
year the property was placed in service, disposed of or retired.
A half-year convention applies to three, five, seven, ten, 15 and
20 year property, permitting a half-year of depreciation the year
the property is placed in service or removed from service, unless
already depreciated out.  Under proposed regulations, property
subject to the half-year convention when placed in service must
be treated as subject to the half-year convention when disposed
of or retired.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-1(c).   If
property subject to a half-year convention is acquired and
disposed of in the same taxable year, no depreciation is
allowable since the property is treated as placed in service and
disposed of on the same date.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.168(d)-1(b)(3)(ii) .
If more than 40 percent of the aggregate basis of property
placed in service during a taxable year (other than residential
rental property, nonresidential real property and property
disposed of later in the same taxable year) is placed in service
during the last three months of the taxable year, a mid-quarter
convention applies to all property placed in service during the
taxable year (other than residential rental property and
nonresidential real property).  I.R.C. § 168(d)(3).  For purposes
of the 40 percent test, the aggregate basis of property placed in
service does not include the basis of property to which Section
168 does not apply but does include the basis of "listed
property". Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-1(b).   In
determining the "basis" of property for purposes of the 40
percent test, any expense method depreciation to be claimed is
subtracted and any personal use of the property is reflected in
the calculation.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-1(b)(4).
Property placed in service and disposed of in the same
taxable year is disregarded for purposes of the 40 percent test.
I.R.C. § 168(d)(3)(ii).  However, property placed in service and
disposed of in the same taxable year may be entitled to
depreciation if the mid-quarter convention rules apply to that
property.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-1(b)(3).
The 40 percent test is applied at the partnership or S
corporation level unless the entity was formed or availed of for
the principal purpose of using or avoiding the application of the
mid-quarter convention.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-
1(b)(6).  Property subject to the mid-quarter convention when
placed in service is subject to the mid-quarter convention when
disposed of or retired.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(d)-
1(c) .
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Where depreciable property, other than residential rental
property and nonresidential real property, is placed in service in
the same year that the property is transferred to an entity under a
tax-free transfer (such as a contribution to a partnership or
corporation), the 40 percent test is applied by treating the
transferred property as placed in service by the transferee on the
date of transfer but is not included in the 40 percent test for the
transferor's depreciation purposes.  Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.168(d)-1(b)(7).   However, in applying the applicable
convention, the recovery period begins on the date, as
determined by the applicable convention, the property was
placed in service by the transferor.  55 Fed. Reg. 53571
(Dec. 31, 1990), adding Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.168(d)-1 .
IRA'S.  The taxpayer had funded an IRA with a rollover
distribution from an employee retirement plan.  The taxpayer
was to receive payments from the IRA amortized over the
taxpayer's life expectancy as determined under Treas. Reg. §
1.72-9 with an interest rate of 10.6 percent.  The IRS ruled that
the payments were substantially equal periodic payments not
subject to the 10 percent tax imposed on early IRA
distributions under Section 72(t)(1).   Ltr. Rul. 9050046 ,
Sept. 18, 1990.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES.  A partnership owned
leased fee interests in improved industrial zone real property
which was the subject of governmental condemnation.  The
IRS ruled that the acquisition of fee simple or long-term (more
than 30 years) leases with the proceeds of the condemnation was
eligible for like-kind exchange treatment so long as none of the
proceeds represented compensation for the partnership's interest
in the improvements.  Ltr. Rul. 9049011, Sept. 6 ,
1990 .
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The partnership
audit and litigation procedures applied to a partnership where the
only evidence of the partnership's existence before 1982 was a
partnership agreement and application for taxpayer identification
number.  The IRS claim that the partnership was a sham did
not affect the application of the procedures.  Consolidated
Cable, Ltd. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-657.
The Tax Court held that it did not have jurisdiction over a
refund suit involving a redetermination of assessments made
against limited partners as a result of a final partnership
administrative adjustment or a redetermination of interest on a
substantial understatement of tax.  English v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1990-662.
S CORPORATIONS
AUDIT PROCEDURES.  An S corporation with three
shareholders was held not exempt from the unified audit and
litigation rules before the regulations were issued allowing such
an exemption.  The corporation's largest shareholder was the tax
matters person in absence of a designation by the corporation.
Twenty-Three Nineteen Creekside, Inc. v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 1990-649.
NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS.  An S corporation had
31 qualified subchapter S trusts as shareholders with some of
the beneficiaries as spouses of beneficiaries of other QSST
trusts.  One individual shareholder created three more QSST's.
The IRS ruled that married beneficiaries of separate QSST's
would be considered as one shareholder.  Ltr. R u l .
9052048, Oct. 3, 1990.
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS.  A corporation liquidated its
subsidiary and elected to be an S corporation.  The corporation
then transferred the assets of the liquidated subsidiary to a
partnership in exchange for a general partnership interest, with
another S corporation as another general partner.  The IRS ruled
that both corporations could retain their S corporation status
because the partnership was formed for valid business reasons
other than circumventing the S corporation rules.  Ltr. R u l .
9050021, Sept. 14, 1990.
RE-ELECTION.  An S corporation revoked its S
corporation election in January 1990 and the shareholders sold
all of their stock to unrelated persons.  In March 1990, the new
shareholders requested permission to make a new S corporation
election effective on January 1, 1991.  The IRS granted the
request.  Ltr. Rul. 9050050, Sept. 19, 1990.
TERMINATION.  The IRS waived as inadvertent the
termination of a corporation's S status when the transfer of a
corporate asset to an inactive subsidiary resulted in gross
income for the subsidiary and the corporation distributed the
stock of the subsidiary to the shareholders upon learning of the
effect on S corporation status.  Ltr. Rul. 9050020, Sept .
14, 1990.
The IRS waived as inadvertent the termination of a
corporation's S status when trusts holding stock failed to make
the election to be treated as qualified subchapter S trusts but
filed the elections as soon as the failure was discovered.  Ltr.
Rul. 9052005, Sept. 26, 1990.
The IRS waived as inadvertent the termination of a
corporation's S status when the beneficiary of a trust owning
stock did not sign, as a beneficiary, the election for the trust to
be treated as QSST but only signed as trustee and the
corporation had passive investment income in excess of 25
percent of gross receipts while the corporation had C
corporation earnings and profits.  Ltr. Rul. 9052006 ,
Sept. 26, 1990.
WITHHOLDING TAXES .  The IRS has issued
proposed regulations governing the manner in which employers
are to compute deposit liability at the end of a deposit period
and implementing new Section 6302(g) concerning the
acceleration of the deposit due date of employment taxes of
$100,000 or more.  56 Fed. Reg. 395 (Jan. 4, 1991).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
DAMAGES.  The plaintiffs were lessors of farm land who
claimed that the defendant tenants failed to sign the ten year
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lease under which the parties had been operating for several
years.  The lessors then enrolled the land in the federal
Conservation Reserve Program and the tenants were required to
plow up 83 acres of pubescent wheat grass seed in order to
remain qualified for federal farm program payments.  The court
held that the tenants' damages awarded would not be reduced
because the tenants could have plowed up other fields which
would have produced less loss where the trial court had
substantial credible evidence to support its holding that the
tenants did not fail to mitigate their damages.  Fordyce v .
Musick, 800 P.2d 1045 (Mont. 1990).
NEGLIGENCE
RECREATIONAL USE .  The plaintiff was injured on
the defendants' land while attending a hayride organized by the
defendants' son and paid for by the employer of the plaintiff and
the defendants' son.  The court held that a hayride was a
recreational activity included in the Illinois Recreational Use of
Land and Water Areas Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 70, ¶ 31 et seq.),
which provides that a landowner owes no duty to keep the
premises safe for use by a person for recreational purposes.
Lane v. Titchenel, 562 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. Ct. App.
1990) .
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST.
The defendant had granted a bank a security interest in the
defendant's farm land and other property.  The defendant
purchased some cattle under a contract providing that title to the
cattle would not pass until any payment check had cleared.  The
defendant obtained a loan from a third party to purchase the
cattle and the third party filed its security interest within 20
days of the defendant's receiving title to the cattle but more than
20 days after the defendant had received possession of the cattle.
The court held that the purchase money security interest in the
cattle held priority over the bank's security interest, under Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch 26, ¶¶ 9-107, 9-312(4), because the security
interest was filed within 20 days after the defendant had received
title to the cattle.  DeKalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d
1223 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
SALE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND.  The taxpayers
sold 3.75 acres of land, .75 acres of which was assessed as
agricultural land and caused the taxpayers to be assessed a
penalty tax under the Agricultural Land Transfer Tax (ALTT) on
the sale price less the cash value of the non-agricultural land and
improvements.  The taxpayers objected to the calculation
method of the taxable portion of the sale price as violating due
process and equal protection.  The court held that the calculation
method did not violate due process because the subtraction of
the full cash value of the nonagricultural property would leave
only the full cash value of the agricultural property subject to
tax.  The fact that the tax could also have been calculated on the
fair market value of the agricultural land did not mean that the
calculation method used violated due process.  The court also
held that the calculation method did not violate the equal
protection clause because the taxpayers did not show any
discrimination or intentional systematic undervaluation of a
class of property.  Supervisor of Assessments v .
Scheidt, 582 A.2d 563 (Md. Ct. App. 1990).
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
EQUITABLE CONVERSION.  In the decedent's will,
29 acres of land and all personal property were bequeathed to the
decedent's surviving spouse with all remaining real property
passing to the decedent's children.  In 1987, the decedent
appointed an attorney as attorney-in-fact under a durable power
of attorney.  In early 1988, the decedent was injured in and
accident an remained comatose until death six months later.
During the decedent's illness, the attorney-in-fact sold the
decedent's farm on installment contract which remained
outstanding at the decedent's death.  The court held that the sale
of the farm on contract did not convert the property to personal
property under the equitable conversion doctrine codified in Ind.
Code § 29-1-13-6 because the decedent did not personally sell
the farm.  Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127 (Ind. C t .
App. 1990).
CITATION UPDATE
Chilingirian v. Comm'r, 918 F.2d 1251 (6th
Cir. 1990), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1986-463  (discharge of
indebtedness), see p. 5 supra.
NEW PUBLICATIONS
Neil E. Harl, The Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980s ,
Iowa State University Press, 1990.  The book provides a
personal account of the economic and political forces which
created and eventually worked to alleviate the farm debt crisis.
The book may be ordered from Iowa State University Press,
2121 State Ave., Ames, Iowa, 50010, $24.95 plus $2.00
shipping (Iowa residents add sales tax).
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